Weakness In Corporate Governance And Lack Of Transparency Accounting Essay

impuissance In Corporate Governance And Lack Of Transp bency Accounting experimentWeakness in corporate presidential term and lack of transparency are considered ca examples of the Asian m itary crisis. (Wan et al 2010 ). The corporate scandals happened in the early 2000s urged regulators close to the world to suit the medicine to illness of the global pecuniary stability by institute CG reforms. For instance, the Combined engrave and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were then introduced and enacted in UK and US respectively. As an international financial and business hub, Hong Kong is bound to propose its share of the sweeping impact of the Asian financial crisis and the scandals. Hong Kong Stock sub determined to introduce the encrypt of CG effective from 2005, with similar provisions on financial disclosures in the world. Most of the studies employ US and UK info indicated that the character reference of corporate presidential term practices has improved when firms comply wi th the provisions of the code. A sketch conducted by a search team headed by Professor Stephen Cheung in Hong Kong generated a consistent go away with those studies it indicated that the CG standard of Hong Kong listed firms had been improved obviously in 2005.2.1.3. Earning ManagementWhile regulators aware the issues about CG subsequently the scandals, the confidence of investors rough the world who rely on the reported lettuce on the financial statement to make their investment decisions have been significantly shaken. Earnings is always the most crucial indicator to evaluate how a firm performs. EM refers to manipulation of a firms net through direct or verifying accounting methods to achieve a desired train and that does not confer the economic reality to mislead FS users about the corporate performance or gaining self-interest. In short, the practices of EM deter the credibility of financial reporting. at that place is heaps of empirical researches evidence that go od CG improve the transparency of the lineament financial reporting which provides more decision-useful information to investors regardless of the geographical location of the listed company. almost of GCG mechanisms include the existence of unaffiliated lineup of managers, scrutinise military commission, no chief executive officer duality, no Top Share (controlling shareholder), and shareholders coalition in order to prospect controlling shareholder. ( Werner R. Murhadi 2009).2.1.4. The unique features of Hong Kong Firms.A global code of CG should not be applied as a standard among the world attributed to the unique settings of from each one jurisdiction. It is important for regulators and analysts to understand the unique features and regional conditions affect the incentive of managing simoleons and the reporting pure tone. in that respectfore, Most of the researches have through with(p) to investigate the relationship amidst the CG practices and EM with US entrop y, only a few o f them analyses about the issues in other regions. An assumption that a same result go forth be concluded when analyzing HK information is doubtful. The widely acknowledged family self-will assiduity characteristic of HK listed firms is still considered as the major contributor of the misfortune of CG even after the introduction of the code. See the vote manipulation done by PCCW and the affair of Citic Pacific in 2009.2.2 Literature reviewThe research paper which examine whether the disclosure of Corporate Governance Structures affect the mart valuation of earnings surprises and firms earnings management, Jui-Chin Chang and Huey-Lian Sun (2010), suggested that the effectiveness of corporate arrangement in monitor earnings management is improved after the mandated disclosure. This decision is consistent with the result of the research on CG and earnings forecasts accuracy which support that it is effective to enhance the quality of financial disclosure by rewr ite the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance to encourage public companies to implement good governing body practices. (Ahmad-Zaluki et al 2010).However, Davies and Schlitzer (2008) in their paper brocaded the question about the practicality of an international one size fits only corporate organisation code of best practice and the result of the paper implied that the adoption of a global corporate governance code is limited out-of-pocket to the adaptations in the business environment. Ching, M.L.K. et al. (2002) in their research contended that CG mechanisms and supervise and oversight activities will affect the use of EM, and the importance of these factors varies across firms and national jurisdictions. Because CG, the legal environment, and observe activities are far contrary in Hong Kong than in the U.S., research studies employ American data have limited relevance for HK.A large-mouthed proportion of HK listed firms are controlled by families. When most of the res ults of empirical researches supported the exacting link between the CG mechanism and firms earnings quality, the unique features of Hong Kong is not universe considered in those researches. A rare research done by Jaggi, B., et al. (2009) employ samples before the adoption of code of corporate governance and find that a higher proportion of independent corporate boards of HK firms is associated with more effective monitoring to constrain EM by deterring managers from manipulating the reported earnings thus the earnings quality is expected to be high despite differences in institutional environments. However, it is not the case of which the firms are family-controlled, either through ownership concent ration or the presence of family members on corporate boards.2.3 ObjectiveWhile unbounded studies have already done with data of regions other than HK about the association between CG and EM, whatsoever of them have also emphasized on the identity operator of family ownership co ncentration in Asian regions. This study is done for the enjoyment of evaluating the effectiveness of the Code of Corporate Governance Practices effective from 2005 on trim back EM practices and improving earnings quality of HK Firms. Focus on the uniqueness of the Hong Kong Firms ownership structure to investigate whether mandatory disclosure of corporate governance structures improves the quality of financial information of Hong Kong family-controlled firms.2.4 Statement of hypothesis2.4.1 Indentifying Corporate governanceThe research generated by Dey, (2008) examined that different countries have different corporate governance structure. She considered twelve variables of corporate governance to measure different corporate governance structure, such as the effectiveness of the size up committee and duality of chief executive officers and so on. To determine corporate governance, we would use five variables including a majority-independent visit committee, a majority-independ ent board, financial professional having sufficient accounting experience on the committee, life-size 4 auditors and the separation CEO and chair position.2.4.2 Audit committee and earning qualityAccording to Hong Kong Exchange and clearing limited (HKEX), after the adoption of code of corporate governance effective that is in 2005, it is a must for Hong Kong listed companies to pull in an audit committee, comprising non-executive manager (NED) and having at least three members. Based on the research of Bedard, and Courteau (2001), the higher the percentage of independent non-executive director that are not managers in other firms, the higher the earning quality is. Thus, the hypothesis we develop should beH1 There is validatory relationship between the existence of a majority-independent audit committee and earning quality after the code2.4.3. Independent board of director and earning managementAccording to Liu and Lu (2007), they rear that when preparing financial statement, the board of director can help to monitor and prevent controlling shareholder as this act may make damage to the other shareholder. Besides, the Hong Kong boards of director were by code at least three NED members as well.H2 There is positive relationship between the proportion of Independent non-executive directors on the board and earning quality after the code.2.4.4. CEO duality and earning managementAccording to R. Murhadi, Werner. Dr (2009), he found that if there is any job duality, it was less effective and strongly ascertain higher level of discretionary accrual. Anderson et al. (2003) found that earnings informativeness is positively associated with firms having disjointed CEO and chair positionsH3 The existence of CEO duality positively influences the level of earnings management after the code.2.4.4 risky 4 auditors and earning managementThe precedent research done by Klein (2003) found that Big 4 auditors may shift some of their responsibility of monitoring financi al reporting to firms audit committees after SOX. Therefore, there may be difference between discretionary accruals and Big 4 auditor in the before period of SOX.H4 There is a negative relation between earning management and proportion of Big 4 auditors after the code.2.4.5 Experts in audit committee and earning managementThe Code in Hong Kong required that among the three members, it should include at least an independent NED with sufficient and appropriate financial experience. Xie, Davison, and DaDalt (2003) use pre-SOX samples to investigate that audit committee members having financial experience/background negatively influence discretionary accruals.H5 There is a negative relation between discretionary accruals and the existent of financial experts on audit committees after the code.2.4.6. family control and earning managementDue to the different expectations regarding the effect of family control on earnings management, Jaggi-Leung use pre-code sample to denominate that an i ncrease in the proportion of outside directors to strengthen board monitoring is unlikely to be effective in family-controlled firms. The percentage of NED on the board to a pith bend of directors is counted 20% as cut-off point.H6 There is a negative relation between the existent of family ownership control and earnings quality after the code.3.Methodology3.1 Sample collectionIt is to search the WiseNews Database and HKEX website to collect the data for all Hong Kong Listed Firms in all industry for years before and after adoption of code which is accounting period of 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 respectively.3.2 Research DesignBy using the financial data examined from the above database, it is decided to research all firms excluding banks, insurance and trusts companies as they manage earning obtaining different incentives and opportunities. (Peasnell et al, 2000) For testing earnings management, Dechow et al., 1995 suggested to use modified jones model to measure discretionary accru als. However, based on Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), in addition to the modified model, they use return on assets as one of variable so as to estimate accruals more accurately. It is cross-sectional retroversion by using two-digit SIC code, then find out the estimated coefficient by the following formula(Total discretionary accrual) TACCjt = 0+ 1(1/ ATit-1)+ 2 (DSale/ATit-1)+ 3 (PPE/ ATit-1)+ 4 ROAit-1- (1)Then, NON-ACCjt = 1(1/ATjt-1) + 2 (DSalesjt DRECjt)/ATjt-1 +3 (PPE/ATjt-1) +4 ROAjt (2)Then, calculating the discretionary accrual by using the following formula,DACCjt = TACCjt NON-ACCjt (3)Using the regression model to calculating the data before and after the code of corporate governance,DACCit = p 0 + 1 Auditindep + 2 BdIndep + 3 AccExp + 4 CEODua + 5 Big 4 + FAMOWN (4)WhereROA = the ratio of net income to total assetsFAMOWN = 1 if proportion of family members divided by total outcome director is greater than 20%, 0 for other than this case.BdIndep The number of ind ependent board directors calculated by the no. of board membersAuditIndep The number of independent audit committee members calculated by the no. of audit committee membersAccExp 1 for having financial professional experience and 0 for none and divided by the no. of audit committee membersBig 4 It is an indicator of the Big 4 auditors. It is one if the firm was Big 4 accounting firms client and it is zero if not.CEODua it may be 1 when CEO is the firms director of the board, 0 when it is not the case.4. Time scheduleTime fillJanuary intermit the background of the problem and objectivesResearch data for methodology initiative 11th FebruaryFinish MethodologyCollect data by using software i.e. Excel12th 28th FebruarySolve the problems that will envision during the process of collecting data, such as, uncertainty about any dataAnalyze data and make result of the analysisMarch hold open discussionsInterpret the data what we findFinish recommendations, conclusions, summary of the proje ct1 4th AprilFinish the draft to supervisor5 28th AprilFinish the reference listsReview and proofread the grammar, organization, format of projectAmend some parts based on comments of supervisors