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The Battle of Mogadishu EssayThe Battle of Mogadishu took place in the narrow streets of Mogadishu, Somalia October 3-4 1993 oer 17 hours. 160 United Nations battleants under the command of US General William Garrison fought an estimated cc0 supporters of the warlord, General Mohammed Farah Aidid, issue of the Somali National Alliance. The Battle generated considerable public interest and debate, impacting US foreign policy and incoming UN missions. Among many books on the incident ar those by Mike Durant, a combatant and Mark Bowden, who conducted all-encompassing interviews. Parkers Military History online contains hireful data.The background was the outbreak of civil war after potentate Mohammed Siad Barre had been ousted by clan gaffers in January 1991, who set their differences aside long enough to topple him. Their unity did non survive and civil war began. Two parties emerged, one under Aidid and one under Ali Mahdi. The civilian population, caught in the middle, experienced severe hardship. More than 300, 000 died from starvation (Durant 2). Thousands crossed into neighboring states as refugees. When the international community responded with nutrition aid, warlords hijacked supplies to use them to purchase arms.The UN launched Operation Provide Relief (United Nations Operation in Somalia I) in April 1992. This did little to baulk the crisis because hardly any food actually fed anyone. The United Nations then requested members to send combat troops to Somalia, to protect the food convoys. President George H. W Bush of the United States agreed to deploy 250,000 US troops. Known as Operation Restore Hope, or UNITAF (United Nations Unified Task Force) the mandate, dated December 3 1992, was restricted to supporting the humanitarian effort.This mandate was extended in marching 1993 to include nation edifice- ending the war, establishing a stable state and a democratically elected government. When Bill Clinton became President, he lessen the train of US involvement to 1200 combat and 3000 support troops. Italy, Pakistan and Malaysia also joined the UN force, now called UNOSOM-II, established in March 1993. UNOSOM-II consisted of 15,000 military and police personnel. Fifteen of the sixteen clans agreed to cooperate with the UN force. Aidid refused.The UN subsequently ordered its forces to demilitarise Aidids militia. On June 5 1993 a contingent of Pakistani soldiers engaged in this task clashed with Aidids troops in Mogadishu, suffering 24 casualties (Bowden 427). The UN responded by ordering the apprehension of those responsible for their deaths, so that they could nonplus on trial. US troops received intelligence that Aidids foreign affairs advisor and chief political advisor were at the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu to attend a high level meeting, possibly with Aidid himself.Based on this intelligence, a US led strike code named Operation knightly Serpent was planned for October 3, 1993. The force consisted of 16 0 men drawn from Delta Force (US particular(prenominal) Operations Force), forest fire fighters from the seventy-fifth Regiment, Navy SEALS and from the Air Force, supported by 19 M H-60 Black Hawk choppers from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. The plan involved personnel fast-roping down from the eggwhisks, securing the targets so that they could then be retrieved by ground vehicles (12 in number) then transported back to the US headquarters.The Humvees were due to consider the Hotel shortly after the carrying into action began. Under Captain Michael Steele, four Rangers secured the perimeter to prevent anyone entering or leaving the Hotel. Another Ranger blocked the road, while the Delta police squad entered the Hotel at 15 32 (Bowden 4). Colonel Danny McKnight commanded the ground convoy, whose SEALS were meant to assist the assault team (Bowden 59). At 15 42, the first Delta operatives add the Hotel, capturing both men and 22 other senior Aidid aids. unriv aled Ranger, Todd Blackburn lost his grip and fell 70 feet, injuring himself (Bowden 4).By 15 47 Somalis had crowded the area somewhat the Hotel, impeding the progress of the ground convoy, making it impossible to keep to schedule. At 16 20, an enemy roquette hit Black Hawk Super 61, which crashed five blocks North of the Hotel. Both the ground assault portion and the exfil convoy were ordered to re-group at the crash site (Durant 20). Although the supporting helicopter crews tried to send warnings nearly roadblocks and detour information to the convoy, the communication system was too slow. The helicopters could not speak directly to the convoy still had to do so via their commanders.By 16 35, the convoy had lost its way. Search and economy teams were dispatched to assist the struck helicopter, which resulted in the US switching the point of attack from the Hotel where the prisoners and their Delta force captors were waiting to be retrieved to three vitamin C yards West (St evenson 94). At 16 40, Black Hawk Super 64 was brought down a myocardial infarction to the southwest of the Hotel. Again, a rescue team was sent to retrieve the crew. As soon as the aircraft hit the ground, hundreds of armed Somalis, some civilian some members of militia, appeared at the scene. 99 US personnel were surrounded at the first crash site.At 16 42, two members of Delta force volunteer to lower themselves to the second downed helicopter to help defend the injured crew. At 17 40 both were killed, together with all members of the helicopter crew except the commanding office, Mike Durant who was dragged away by militia. The ground convoy and a rescue convoy failed to reach their targets, returning to HQ at 17. 45. At 19. 08, Black Hawk 66 dropped supplies and ammo to the soldiers trapped at the first crash site. A new rescue squad, including Pakistani and Malaysian soldiers, go forth HQ at 23. 23, reaching the trapped men at 1. 55 October 4. At 5.30, the troops are able to begin to leave the city on foot heading for the Pakistani compound. By 6. 30, it had been confirm that 13 US soldiers were dead, 73 injured with six missing. The final toll was 18 dead. Durant was released on October 14. March 24, 1994 all US troops left Somalia, followed by all UN troops the following year. Between 200 and 500 Somalis died. Subsequently, the US and the UN became reluctant to commit forces where little real agreement exists on the ground betwixt rival parties. Washington became reluctant to commit troops to situations that present no direct security threat to the US itself.In addition, strategic lessons have been learned from the battle. These are especially relevant in situations where insurgents run low with local populations. First, intelligence the US did not know that Aidid possessed rocket propelled grenades. Aidid planned to neutralize US air support, then flooded the battle zone with superior numbers. He was also prepared to use civilians as human shield s (Stevenson 94). Claims have been made that Italian soldiers tipped Aidid off about the operation, which would explain wherefore militia with rockets reached the scene so quickly.Also, better knowledge of Somali city streets would have helped the ground forces reach their targets (OHanlon 119). The Somalis had the advantage of local knowledge. Second, direct communication from air support to ground may have prevented convoys from get lost. Thirdly, too few troops were deployed against a much larger foe albeit crack troops against freedom fighter and poorly trained insurgents. The basic plan, though, was sound, the type of extraction for which the forces involved were well trained. Technically, too, the operation was successful, since 24 insurgents were interpreted into custody.References Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down A Story of Modern War. New York Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999. Durant, Michael J. , and Steven Hartov. In the Company of Heroes. New York G. P. Putnams Sons, 2003. O Hanlon, Michael E. Technological Change and the Future of Warfare. Washington, D. C. Brookings Institution Press, 2000. Parker, Larry. The Battle of Mogadishu. Military History Online http//www. militaryhistoryonline. com/ public/articles/mogadishu. aspx Accessed April 25 2009. Stevenson, Jonathan. Losing Mogadishu Testing U. S. Policy in Somalia. Annapolis, Md Naval Institute Press, 1995.